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U.S. MOTOR CARRIER HOURS OF SERVICE REGULATIONS:
THEIR IMPACT ON CARRIER PROFITABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY
Ahren Johnston
Missouri State University
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the history of hours of service regulations for U.S. motor carriers and
investigates the changes to individual carrier profitability and productivity from the last major
change to those regulations in 2003. The results of the analysis indicate that operating ratio
worsened and sales per employee improved, and return on assets and return on equity were
unchanged due to hours of service changes. The implications of these results given the recent
changes to hours of service regulations in 2011 are also discussed.

INTRODUCTION
With the major change to the Federal Motor
Carrier Administration (FMCSA) Hours of
Service regulations announced in December
2011(HOS, 2011), there has been increased
interest in how this will impact motor carriers.
Prior to the publication of the final rule, several
studies regarding highway safety and the health
of truck drivers were published (Hall and
Mukherjee, 2008; Jovanis et al., 2005; Min,
2009; Saltzman and Belzer, 2002), but little or
no research has been conducted on the impact of
HOS on the profitability and productivity of
individual firms. The Regulatory Impact
Analysis (FMCSA, 2010) includes an estimate
of the cost of reduced productivity at the macro
level but not at the firm level. The estimates
used to calculate reduced productivity were also
called into question in a paper prepared for the
American Trucking Association by Edgeworth
Economics (2011). Due to the questions about
research on the impact of HOS on costs and
productivity at the macro level, and a lack of
research at the firm level; this paper will
investigate the impact of changes to HOS at the

firm level, which may also add some insight into
the macro-economic impact of these changes.
The last major change to HOS occurred in 2003
and went into effect in January of 2004. The
2003 HOS reduced the allowable on-duty time
per work/rest cycle1 by one hour, increased the
allowable driving time per work/rest cycle by
one hour, and decreased the on-duty and work
time per day by two hours. However, with the
addition of the 34 hour restart2, the maximum
on-duty and driving time per week were
increased by 14 and 7 hours and the maximum
long-term average on-duty and driving hours
were increased by approximately 21 and 14
hours. These dramatic changes led to a period of
uncertainty concerning the future of HOS with
multiple law suits, court actions, and acts of
Congress, which resulted in the issuance of the
2011 HOS.
Before the final 2011 HOS were publicized,
there was discussion about decreasing the onduty and driving hours per work/rest cycle by
one to two hours, but the final rule retained the
14 hour on duty and 11 hour driving limits per
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work/rest cycle from the 2003 HOS. The most
significant change to the 2011 HOS is the
requirement of a minimum 30 minute break after
8 hours of driving and severely limiting the use
of the 34 hour restart. Under the new rule, the
34 hour restart can only be used once per week
(168 hours) and must include two time periods
between 1:00 am and 5:00 am. The once per
week restriction is intended to allow a driver to
work one long week but force him to follow that
with a short week, and the 1:00 am through 5:00
am restriction is intended to allow night drivers
two periods of night rest to recover (FMCSA,
2011). While these changes will not impact the
maximum daily or weekly driving or on-duty
times, they will restrict the maximum average
weekly driving and on-duty times to a point
halfway between those allowed under the 1962
HOS and the 2003 HOS. Therefore looking at
the impact of the 2003 HOS changes to motor
carrier profitability and productivity should give
some insight into the impact of the 2011 HOS on
motor carriers.
This paper investigates the actual impact of the
last major change to the HOS on profitability
and productivity of publicly traded motor
carriers. Quarterly data from 1997-2010 for 14
publicly traded motor carriers was used. To see
the impact on profitability, Operating Ratio (OR)
and Return on Assets (ROA) were dependent
variables in two separate models. The variable
of interest was a dummy variable with a value of
zero for the time periods before the change to
HOS (1997-2003) and a value of one for the
time periods after the change (2004-2010).
Various control variables were also included to
account for economic and regulatory changes
that took place in the sample period. To see the
impact on productivity, a similar model was
tested with sales per employee as the dependent
variable. Results of the estimations indicate that
24
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the 2004 HOS led to better productivity, a worse
OR, and no significant change to ROA. These
results would suggest that the 2011 HOS will
potentially negatively impact productivity and
positively impact profitability.
HISTORY OF HOURS OF SERVICE
RULES
HOS were first proposed by the ICC in 1936 and
went into effect in July of 1938. These rules
allowed for 15 hours on-duty and 12 hours of
work per day, which could all be driving or
could also include other tasks such as loading,
unloading, and completing paperwork. Drivers
were also required to have at least 9 hours off
duty each day. A limit of 60 hours on-duty in 7
days or 70 hours on-duty in 8 days was also
instated. These rules resulted in protests from
both organized labor and some motor carriers, so
in early 1939 revised rules went into effect.
These new rules reduced the required off duty
time to 8 hours per day and implemented a 10
hour driving limit per day instead of the previous
12 hours of work per day. The next change came
in 1962 when, for unexplained reasons, the ICC
changed the rule to allow for a maximum driving
time of 10 hours and on duty time of 15 hours,
which could be extended to 16 hours with
breaks, after 8 hours off duty, so maximum on
duty and driving time per day became
maximums per work/rest cycle. This change
allowed drivers up to 16 hours of driving and
on-duty time per day (FMCSA, 2000). The 1962
hours of service regulations increased the
maximum driving time per day, but the retention
of the weekly limits kept maximum and average
weekly driving times the same. A driver could
simply reach his 8 day on-duty limit in 5 days
rather than 7 days, allowing for greater
flexibility in scheduling.
The HOS remained virtually unchanged until
2003. With the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
jurisdiction for HOS was given to the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA). The FHWA

was asked by Congress to re-examine HOS with
a focus on public safety and driver health. An
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking was
issued in 1996, but no further action was taken.
In 2000 jurisdiction was transferred to the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) and a notice of proposed rulemaking
was issued. In 2003 the FMCSA issued a final
rule, which went into effect in January 2004.
The 2003 HOS decreased maximum on-duty
time to 14 hours (including any breaks),
increased maximum driving time to 11 hours per
work/rest cycle, and increased off duty time to
10 hours. Furthermore, the 34 hour restart was
added, which allows a driver to reset the 7 or 8
day time limit effectively adding up to 14 hours
to a driver’s work week (Jones, 2007). The 2003
HOS led to a period of unrest and uncertainty
about the future of hours of service regulations
in the U.S.
The first lawsuit following the 2003 HOS was
filed by the consumer advocacy group, Public
Citizen, before the rule even went into effect,
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit struck down the rule in 2004 citing the
fact that the FMCSA failed to take into account
driver health, as required by law, when setting
the 2003 HOS. Following that court ruling,
Congress granted temporary relief from the
ruling, and President Bush signed the Surface
Transportation Extension Act of 2004, giving
FMCSA a year to come up with a rule
addressing the court’s issues with the 11 hour
driving limit and 34 hour restart. In January
2005 FMCSA issued a notice of proposed rules
that make few changes to the 2003 HOS other
than changes to the split sleeper berth
provisions. This was subsequently published as
a final rule in August 2005 and went into effect
in October 2005. In 2006 Public Citizen once
more filed suit in federal court arguing for
different changes in the HOS, which resulted in

a federal appeals court vacating two provisions
of the rule in July 2007. At the request of the
American Trucking Association, the court issued
a 90 day stay to its mandate in September 2007.
The FMCSA then issued an interim final rule in
December 2007 identical to the 2005 rule, and
this was subsequently issued as a final rule in
November 2008. Public Citizen once more filed
suit in March 2009, and a settlement was
reached before the suit went to court. Therefore,
despite multiple lawsuits resulting in the 2003
HOS being struck down, the 2003 HOS have
remained virtually unchanged. The only change
came in 2005 and mandated that 8 of the 10
hours off duty for drivers operating with a
sleeper berth be taken consecutively (Jones,
2007; Munroe, 2009; Public Citizen, 2012).
As part of a settlement between FMCSA, the
Teamsters Union, Public Citizen and several
safety groups, FMCSA agreed to revise the HOS
taking into account drivers’ health and safety.
The proposed 2011 HOS were released in
December 2010, and the final rule was released
in December 2011. The compliance date for the
on-duty time and egregious violation definitions
and oil field exemption3 was February 27, 2012,
and all other provisions had a compliance date of
July 1, 2013. These new rules maintain a
maximum 11 hours of driving time but require a
30 minute break after 8 hours of driving. The
maximum on-duty time remains at 14 hours but
is effectively reduced to 13.5 with the required
break, unless the break is incorporated with the
split sleeper berth provision. Limitations to the
34 hour restart will require that it include two
periods between 1:00 am and 5:00 am and can
only be used once every 7 days or 168 hours.
Finally, the definition of on-duty time has been
modified to not include any time resting in a
parked vehicle (this could include detention
Spring/Summer 2013
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time) or up to two hours in a passenger seat of a
moving vehicle following 8 hours in the sleeper
berth (FMCSA, 2011). Following the
publication of the final 2011 HOS, the American
Trucking Association filed a petition with a
federal court asking the court to review the 2011
HOS in February 2012 and filed an issue
statement in March 2012. The primary issues
identified are with the limitation to the 34 hour
restart and the inclusion of a mandatory 30
minute break following 8 hours on-duty
(McNally, 2012a; McNally, 2012b).
To help clarify the differences between the
different HOS that have been in place over the
last 74 years, Table 1 summarizes the HOS from
1938 – 2011. This table identifies the maximum
driving and on duty time per sleep/work cycle
and the potential maximum driving and on-duty
time per 24 hour period. In addition the
maximum driving and on-duty time possible in a
single week as well as the potential maximum
average driving and on-duty time is included in
Table 1. These figures are based on a driver
either driving the maximum allowable time,
taking the minimum off duty time, and resuming
driving or being on-duty the maximum
allowable time, taking the minimum off duty
time, and resuming driving. As shown in Table
1, the 2003 HOS reduced both the potential
drive time and on-duty time per day but
significantly increased the potential drive time or
on-duty time per week with the introduction of
the 34-hour restart, and the 2011 HOS reduced
these weekly times to a point approximately
midway between those allowed under the 1962
HOS and the 2003 HOS with the new limitations
on the 34-hour restart. McCartt et al. (2008)
report that approximately 80 per cent of drivers
were using the restart provision as part of their
regular schedule in 2004 and 2005, so the new
26
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limitations to this provision could have
significant impact throughout the trucking
industry.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
For this study, three separate models were
developed to address the impact of the 2003
HOS on motor carrier profitability as measured
by operating ratio (OR), return on assets (ROA),
and return on equity (ROE). A fourth model was
developed to look at the impact on productivity
as measured by sales per employee (SPE). All
four models used the same independent
variables. The variable of interest, PHOS, is a
dummy variable indicating whether an
observation was taken after the 2003 HOS,
which went into effect in January of 2004. The
impact of this regulation is difficult to predict in
advance because, depending on the practices of a
particular firm, the maximum driving time per
day would have either been increased by 1 hour
(maximum time per duty cycle) or decreased by
2 hours (maximum time per day) and on-duty
time was decreased by 1 hour (maximum time
per duty cycle) or 2 hours (maximum time per
day). In addition to the HOS that went into
effect in 2004, two other types of regulations,
Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD) requirements
and stricter emissions standards, likely had
impacts on motor carrier revenues and
profitability and went into effect between 2004
and 2010.
ULSD was phased in between 2006 and 2010
with all 2007 and newer vehicles required to
only run on ULSD. This change had an impact
on the price of diesel and on the price of tractors
which had to be modified in order to run with
the lower lubricity of ULSD. To incorporate
additional operating cost from this change into

TABLE 1:
SUMMARY OF HOS RULES

HOS

Drive
Time
per
Cycle

Drive On-Duty
Time Window
per
per
Day
Cycle

OnDuty
Time
per
Day

OffDuty
Time
per
Cycle

Max.
Wkly.
Drive
Time

Max.
Avg.
Wkly.
Drive
Time

Max.
Wkly.
OnDuty
Time

Max.
Avg.
Wkly.
OnDuty
Time

7(8)
Day
Limit

34-hour
Restart

1938
12
12
12
12
9
70
61.25 70
61.25 60 (70) No
1939
10
10
16
16
8
70
61.25 70
61.25 60 (70) No
16
15
16
8
70
61.25 70
61.25 60 (70) No
19621 10
20032 11
14
14
14
10
77
73.92 84
81.67 60 (70) Yes
20113 11
14
14
14
10
77
66
84
70
60 (70) Limited
1
Before the addition of the 34 hour restart the maximum time a driver could work was 60 hours in 7 days or 70 hours in
8 days (for a carrier operating 7 days per week). However, it was allowable to accumulate all 70 hours within 7 days or
less and take time off duty for the remainder of the 8 days. However, the maximum average work hours per week was
restricted by the 8 day driving limit to 61.25.2 With the addition of the 34 hour restart in 2003, it would be allowable for
a driver to accumulate 66 hours of driving time in 5 days, take a 34 hour break, and accumulate an additional 11 hours
of driving time before week’s end for a total of 77 hours in 7 days (assuming no other on-duty time). Furthermore, the
maximum average long run average driving hours per week was 73.92 hours. A driver with 14 hours of on-duty time
every cycle could accumulate up to 84 hours of on-duty time in a single week (66 hours of driving time) with a
maximum average weekly on-duty time of 81.67 hours.3 With the limitations to the 34 hour restart in 2011, a driver
would be able to maximize daily drive time by incorporating the mandatory 30 minute break into the 2 hour portion of
their split sleeper berth time. In a single day a driver could drive 8 hours, take two hours off duty, drive 3 hours, take 8
hours off duty in the sleeper berth, and drive an additional 3 hours (a driver not using the split sleeper berth provision
could drive a maximum of 13.5 hours in a single day). Continuing the pattern of drive 8, rest 2, drive 3, rest 8 through
66 hours of driving time, using the 34 hour reset and continuing the pattern again would allow for a maximum of 77
hours of driving time in a single week, but would be required to take additional time off the following week for an
average of 66 hours of driving time per week. A driver using 14 hours of on-duty time every cycle and a similar strategy
could work a maximum of 84 hours in a single week but would be limited to 56 hours the following week for an average
of 70 hours on-duty time per week. These maximum weekly and average weekly driving and on-duty times would be
the same for a driver not using the split sleeper berth provision and would generally include a longer week followed by a
shorter week.

the model, the percentage change in average
diesel price from the previous quarter or change
in diesel price (CDP) was used as an
independent variable. The average diesel price
may not be the same for all carriers, but the
percent increase or decrease should be similar
for all carriers operating in all different parts of
the country. Additionally the average diesel
price exhibited a high level of autocorrelation.
Stricter emissions standards were implemented
for 2004 and newer vehicles, and then even
stricter emissions standards were implemented

for 2007 and newer vehicles and phased in
through 2010. Due to the language of the law,
there were modest increases in new vehicle
prices in 2004 and 2007 followed by large
increases in 2010. To incorporate this
information into the model, the average percent
change in new tractor price (CTP) was included
as an independent variable. While it would be
preferable to obtain the actual price per tractor
from each carrier, that information was
unavailable, however, tractors are sold in a
competitive environment, so the average price
increase or decrease should be correlated with
Spring/Summer 2013
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each individual carrier’s cost of equipment. As
with average diesel price, average tractor price
exhibited a high level of autocorrelation, so
percentage change was used in the model.
To control for general economic conditions, the
percentage change in Gross Domestic Product
(GDPD) for the services sector was included in
the model as well as a dummy variable for any
quarter that had a month classified as recession
(REC). To control for the different business
environments less-than-truckload (LTL) and
truckload carriers operate in and the different
business environments between unionized and
non-unionized carriers, dummy variables were

included for LTL and unionized carriers (UC).
Finally, dummy variables were included for the
four quarters of the year. Manufacturing
shipments were considered as an independent
variable, but that measure was highly correlated
with the quarter of the year (Q1-Q4), and a better
fit to the data was obtained by using the
quarterly dummy variables. Firm specific
dummy variables were not included in the
models as indicated by a Hausman Test for
random effects.
Putting these variables together resulted in the
following four equations to be estimated:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
MODEL DATA
For this analysis, quarterly data for 14 out of 17
publicly traded motor carriers with data
available from 1997-2010 was used, resulting in
56 observations per carrier and a total of 784
observations. The years 1997-2010 were
chosen, so there would be an even number of
observations on each side of the 2003 HOS.
Landstar was excluded because it is a non-asset
based carrier, and therefore, operates in a
somewhat different business environment. UPS
Freight and FedEx Freight were also excluded
because their SEC filings don’t separate out the
LTL portion of their business from the express,
28
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small package, and other portions of their
business. Furthermore, YRC Worldwide was
excluded from the estimation of Equation 3 due
to the company’s negative equity in Q2-Q3 2009
and Q1-Q4 2010. Table 2 lists the 14 carriers
included in the sample as well as whether they
were LTL carriers or unionized (UC). For
purposes of the analysis, any carrier with a
significant portion of their business coming from
LTL business was considered LTL because they
would have made the significant capital
investment in terminals required of LTL carriers.

TABLE 2:
CARRIERS INCLUDED IN SAMPLE
Company Name
Arkansas Best Corporation
Celadon Group, Inc.
Con-way, Inc.
Covenant Transportation Group, Inc.
Frozen Food Express Industries, Inc.
Heartland Express, Inc.
J B Hunt, LLC.
Knight Transportation, Inc.
Marten Transport, LTD.
Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
PAM Transportation Systems, Inc.
USA Truck, Inc.
Werner Enterprises, Inc.
YRC Worldwide, Inc.*
*

LTL
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y

Union
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y

Not included in Equation 3 due to negative equity in 6 quarters of the sample period.

The financial data for the carriers (total sales,
cost of goods sold, total assets, total equity, and
number of employees) came from Standard and
Poor’s Compustat North America. From this
data, operating ratio (OR), return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and sales per
employee per quarter in thousands of dollars
(SPE) were calculated. The average tractor price
was obtained from Paccar Truck’s SEC filings,
in which they list the revenue from truck sales
and units sold. The average tractor price was
calculated from this and then adjusted for
inflation using the Producer Price Index (PPI)
for heavy trucks obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) (2012). Average diesel
price was obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) (2012), and it
was also adjusted for inflation using the PPI, and
the CDP was then calculated. GDPD was
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) (2012). Data on recessions was obtained
from the National Bureau of Economic Research

(NBER) (2012). Table 3 lists the variables used
in the analysis as well as some descriptive
statistics. Dummy variables are included to
show what percentage of time or carriers fall
into which categories.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The final four models were estimated using
SHAZAM econometric software with the POOL
command. This is a generalized least squares
(GLS) estimator that assumes and corrects for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within
cross sections, different values of rho for each
cross section, and correlation between error
terms from different cross sections. Initial
testing performed by SHAZAM (Whistler et al.,
20011) indicated that these assumptions were
justified.
The results of the analysis are summarized in
Table 4. The first R2 reported in Table 4 is based
Spring/Summer 2013
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TABLE 3:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES
Variable
OR
ROA
ROE
SPE
CTP
CDP
CGDP
PHOS
LTL
UC
REC
Sources:

Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
86.31
7.31
65.24
4.44
7.80
-69.32
9.64
16.15
-134.77
29.89
7.21
11.82
0.13
2.85
-7.30
1.43
9.48
-32.24
2.34
1.77
-2.30
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.36
0.48
0.00
0.14
0.35
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.00
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012
Paccar, Inc., 1997-2012
Standard and Poor’s Compustat North America, 2011
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012

on the residuals from the Best Linear Unbiased
Predictor (BLUP), which uses the coefficients on
the untransformed variables to predict but then
adjusts that prediction using the residual from
the previous period multiplied by rho for the
particular firm in question. The second R2
reported is based on a method described by Buse
(1973) as an appropriate R2 to use for GLS
estimation. These goodness of fit measures
show that Equations 1 and 3 were most effective
for prediction and Equation 2 explained little of
the variance in return on equity.
The most interesting result of Equation 1 was
that the operating ratio for the firms in question
actually worsened after the 2003 HOS,
indicating that despite the fact that drivers could
accumulate more driving or on-duty hours in a
day or week, many of the carriers were not able
to decrease their expenses relative to revenue.
This appears to be the case even after accounting
for tractor and diesel prices, economic growth,
and recessions. The other results of Equation 1
30
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Max
119.44
18.24
63.31
56.50
12.44
24.00
6.20
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

were much as expected: an increase in
equipment or fuel prices leads to a worse OR, an
increase in GDP leads to a better OR, a recession
leads to a worse OR, and LTL carriers and
unionized carriers experience higher costs than
TL or non-unionized carriers.
The estimated coefficients of Equation 2 and
Equation 3 reveal that the 2003 HOS changes,
tractor prices, and diesel prices have no
significant impact on ROA or ROE; however,
the signs of the estimated coefficients are
negative, consistent with the results of Equation
1. It seems that any increased expenses or
decreased revenue contributing to the higher OR
are able to be accounted for by reducing assets
and equity or exploiting some source of profit
other than from operations. Furthermore,
Equation 2 shows that LTL carriers may be able
to actually achieve a slightly higher ROA than
TL carriers (the sign is positive but only
significant at the 0.10 level), and unionized
carriers tend to have a lower ROA than non-

TABLE 4:
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION
Estimated Coefficient (p-value)
Independent
Variable

Equation1
(OR)

Equation 2
(ROA)

Equation 3
(ROE)

Equation 4
(SPE)

PHOS

0.807
(0.03)

-0.806
(0.25)

-1.783
(0.14)

2.770
(0.00)

CTP

0.043
(0.03)

-0.024
(0.63)

-0.038
(0.72)

0.046
(0.14)

CDP

0.024
(0.00)

-0.004
(0.81)

0.025
(0.48)

0.059
(0.00)

CGDP

-0.208
(0.01)

0.418
(0.02)

0.789
(0.02)

-0.024
(0.84)

REC

0.807
(0.00)

-1.682
(0.01)

-2.832
(0.03)

0.724
(0.09)

LTL

2.828
(0.01)

1.320
(0.09)

-0.450
(0.83)

4.106
(0.01)

UC

7.153
(0.00)

-3.403
(0.02)

1.353
(0.69)

4.849
(0.00)

Q1

85.149
(0.00)

2.972
(0.00)

5.094
(0.00)

25.198
(0.00)

Q2

83.562
(0.00)

5.236
(0.00)

9.447
(0.00)

26.896
(0.00)

Q3

83.635
(0.00)

4.416
(0.00)

8.911
(0.00)

27.501
(0.00)

Q4

83.938
(0.00)

3.797
(0.00)

7.172
(0.00)

27.334
(0.00)

0.896
0.312

0.417
0.113

0.314
0.108

0.863
0.228

R2

BLUP
R2
BUSE
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unionized carriers. Equation 3, on the other
hand, shows no significant difference in ROE
between LTL and TL carriers or between
unionized and non-unionized carriers, but this
result is likely due to the fact that the largest LTL
and unionized carrier was excluded from the
sample. Other hypotheses confirmed by
Equation 2 and Equation 3 are that a growing
economy allows for higher ROA and ROE and a
recession is associated with a lower ROA and
ROE.
Rather than financial performance, Equation 4
deals with productivity, and the results are much
as expected because longer driving times per day
and week should lead to the same work being
accomplished with fewer employees. Sales per
employee increased after the 2003 HOS
regulatory change. Tractor price increases have
no significant impact on SPE. Diesel price
increases have a slight impact on SPE likely due
to the increase in revenues from higher fuel
surcharges. GDP changes seem to have no
impact on productivity, but it may be slightly
higher during a recession (significant at the 0.10
level). Finally, LTL and unionized carriers tend
to have higher sales per employee, most likely
because of the higher prices charged to
customers. These higher prices are apparently
not enough to cover the additional expenses
from higher capital expenses for LTL carriers
and higher wages for unionized carriers because
Equation 1 reveals a higher OR for LTL than for
TL carriers and a higher OR for unionized
carriers than for non-unionized carriers.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study indicate that despite
motor carriers being able to increase their sales
per employee after the 2003 HOS, they were
32
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unable to improve or even maintain their
operating ratios. However, they were able to
maintain, but not increase, profitability as
measured by ROA and ROE, possibly due to a
reduced need for capital investments in tractors
and terminals resulting from this increased
productivity. Whatever the reason for this lack
of impact to ROA and ROE, it shows that
publicly traded motor carriers are flexible
enough to maintain these measures of
profitability despite changes to federal
regulations.
The applicability of these results to the impact
on carriers from the 2011 HOS is somewhat
unclear, but one would expect to see somewhat
of a reversal due to the newly added restrictions
to the 34-hour restart provision. This is based on
a survey by McCartt et al. (2008), in which
drivers were interviewed at weigh stations in
Pennsylvania and Oregon in 2004 and again in
2005. The results of the survey indicate that
approximately 80 per cent of drivers drove fewer
or about the same hours per day in 2004 and
2005 as before the 2003 HOS went into effect,
but approximately 80 per cent of drivers use the
restart provision as part of their regular
schedules. This indicates that driving hours per
day were minimally impacted by the changes,
but driving hours per week likely increased
(necessitating the use of the restart provision). If
this is the case, the restriction of the restart
provision implemented in the 2011 HOS will
likely decrease the hours driven per week.
Therefore, assuming the same patterns hold, the
implementation of the 2011 HOS in 2013 will
likely result in both an improved OR and
decreased SPE for motor carriers, and one would
expect to see minimal impact to ROA and ROE.

The results of this study indicate that motor
carriers should not be overly concerned about a
loss of profitability resulting from any
forthcoming reductions in maximum driving
hours per day. While this will not happen in the
immediate future, it could still be an issue
despite the final 2011 HOS including no
reduction to maximum driving time. The final
rule states that if new research comes out
showing improved health of drivers or safety of
the general public from a reduction in maximum
driving time, the rule could be modified
(FMCSA, 2011). If this does occur, carriers
could expect to see minimal changes to
productivity and operating ratio and should be
able to maintain their ROA and ROE if the same
pattern is followed. The results also indicate
that carriers could expect to see minimal
changes to ROA or ROE from the 2011 HOS as
written and a decrease to both operating ratio
and sales per employee. However, it remains to
be decided in court whether the 2011 HOS will
stand as written or be revised yet again.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The most obvious limitation of this research lies
in the sample size and selection. Rather than
taking a representative sample of carriers, a
convenience sample of publicly traded carriers
were used. In the case of the motor carrier
industry the publicly traded carriers are also
some of the largest, but they are also a rather
small group. This limitation leads to the most
obvious extension for future research: to
conduct the same analysis using a larger, more
representative sample. Of course, future
research based on a larger sample would need to
be based on case study or survey data due to the
fact that financial statements are not publicly
available for most motor carriers.

Further limitations of the study were the use of
industry averages for the price of equipment and
the price of fuel due to a lack of availability of
firm specific values for these measures. Using
case study or survey data for future research on
this matter should alleviate this problem. Finally
this study used sales per employee as a measure
of productivity rather than sales per driver or
sales per driver hour. While these measures may
be highly correlated for many carriers, there is
no way to know for sure without both variables.
So the most significant limitations of this
research lie in sample size and selection and
variables used. All of these issues stem from
data availability and could be alleviated by
conducting further research using case study
and/or survey data to get more specific variables
and a larger, more representative sample.

ENDNOTES
One work/rest cycle would include the time from when a
driver comes on duty until he is able to come on duty
again. For a driver, driving as many hours as possible
under the 2003 HOS, this is between 21 and 24 hours with
up to 11 hours of driving, up to 14 hours on duty, and at
least 10 hours of sleep.
1

A driver working every day is allowed a maximum of 70
hours on duty time in 8 days (192 hours), but taking 34
hours off duty allows a driver to reset the clock as if he
had not worked at all in the last 192 hours.
2

The definition of “on duty time” was adjusted to not
include time spent resting in a parked vehicle after being
released from duty, “egregious” HOS violations were
specifically defined as driving 3 or more hours beyond the
driving time limit and subject to maximum civil penalties,
and logging requirements for certain drivers at oil fields
were clarified.
3
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